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A household-level switching regression model is implemented to examine potential selectivity 
bias for rural households under high and low levels of investments in soil conservation in El 
Salvador and Honduras. In the presence of selectivity bias, separate stochastic production 
frontiers are estimated for low and high adopters. The main results indicate that households with 
higher levels of investments in soil conservation show higher average TE than those with a lower 
level of investments. Constrains in the rural land and credit markets are likely explanations for 
these differences. The results also indicate that for farms with lower levels of investments in soil 
conservation access to credit is a significant factor explaining the sources of inefficiency. 
Conversely, households with higher levels of investments have the highest partial output 
elasticity for land, the highest levels of TE and the smallest farms. These results are consistent 
with the presence of a failure in the land market which would limit access to land to the more 
efficient producers. 
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1. Introduction 
Soil erosion is a major contributor to watershed degradation in Central America stemming 
in large part from environmentally unsustainable farming practices. This can have significant 
negative effects on farm-productivity and rural-income along with adverse social and 
environmental consequences (Conroy, 1996). Local governments with the support of 
international donors have undertaken several programs during the last two decades as an effort to 
improve environmental conditions and to reduce poverty among hillside producers. Two of these 
programs, which are the focus of this study, are the Environmental Program for El Salvador 
(PAES) and the Natural Resource Management Program in Honduras (CAJON). Both programs, 
which have recently concluded, were aimed at conserving renewable natural resources in the 
upper watershed of the Lempa River in El Salvador and in the Cajón watershed in Honduras. An 
underlying objective of these programs was to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the rural 
population in their areas of influence by promoting the adoption of soil conservation techniques 
and more diversified cropping patterns.  
The rates of adoption and the factors influencing farmers’ decision to adopt the new 
technologies vary sharply among beneficiary farmers (Cocchi, 2004). This variation provides an 
opportunity to measure the magnitude of the expected gains in productivity resulting from 
different levels of investments in soil conservation. Consequently, the main goal of this paper is 
to study technical efficiency (TE) levels for rural-hillside households under two different levels 
(high and low) of investments in soil conservation.  The rest of this paper is divided into three 
additional sections. The next section describes the empirical model and the data set. The 
  2subsequent section presents and discusses the main results while the last section provides some 
concluding remarks.   
 
2.  Model and data 
To pursue our goal it will be necessary to estimate separate production functions for farms 
under different level of investment in soil conservation. Freeman et al (1998) indicate that this 
estimation could be feasible if the levels of investments vary randomly among the studied farms. 
However, Pattanayak and Mercer (1998) indicate that this might not be the case in this kind of 
analysis since the adoption of a new technology is a voluntary choice exercised by the household. 
Thus, the estimation of separate production functions based on an arbitrary classifying of the 
farms could generate a self-selection problem. Specifically, Maddala (1983) explains that by 
creating the various groups the observations in each might no longer be randomly selected from 
the population if the data in each group depend on the variables affecting the adoption of the 
technology under analysis.  
To account for the potential self-selection bias that may arise in the models to be 
estimated in this study, a switching regression model (SRM) is implemented.  In general terms, a 
SRM corrects for this bias by introducing a set of self-selectivity variables into the productivity 
model. In doing so, the first step in this model is to determine the factors influencing farmers’ 
decisions to invest in soil conservation.  Following Freeman et al (1998) the level of investment 
in soil conservation can be described by a criterion function, which is postulated to be associated 
with exogenous household socioeconomic variables as follows:  
i i i u Z I 0
' + =δ          ( 1 )    
  3where subscript i denotes farm-households, I is the level of investment in soil conservation, Z is a 
vector of exogenous variables, δ are the unknown parameters and uo is the disturbance term.  
Here two investment levels are proposed -high and low- with the sample mean as the breakpoint. 
By doing so, the dependent variable is now dichotomous (I = 1 for a high level of investment and 
0 otherwise) and the parameters in equation (1) can be estimated using a probit model. 
The second step in the SRM is to estimate separate production functions for the two 
groups of farmers.  These production functions can be expressed as: 
i i i u X Y 1 1
'
1 1 + = β  if  I  =   H I G H         ( 2 )  
 
i i i u X Y 2 2
'
2 2 + = β   if I  =   L O W         ( 3 )  
 
where  Y1 and Y2 represent output levels for farm-households with high and low levels of 
investments in soil conservation, respectively, X1 and X2 are input vectors,  1 β and 2 β are the 
unknown parameters, and u1 and u2 are random disturbance terms.  
   Maddala (1983) indicates that OLS estimates of 1 β and 2 β  will yield biased parameters 
because the expected values of the error terms, conditional on the sample selection criterion, are 
non-zero. Furthermore, he argues that the random disturbances, u0, u1 and u2 (equations 1, 2 and 
3, respectively) have a trivariate normal distribution with zero mean and non-singular covariance 
matrix. Thus, to obtain unbiased estimators these equations should be estimated simultaneously 
via maximum likelihood (ML).  To simplify this estimation, Lee (1978) suggests a two-step 
approach where self-selectivity is treated as a missing variable problem. In doing so, the expected 
values of the truncated error terms () 1 1 = I u  and ( ) 0 2 = I u  are equal to: 
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where Z and δ are, respectively, the vector of exogenous variables and the estimated parameters 
from equation (1), and the expressions φ  and Φ are, the probability density and the cumulative 
distribution functions, respectively. 
By introducing W1 and W2 (self-selectivity variables) into equations (2) and (3), 
respectively, the new residuals will present zero conditional mean. So, the estimation of the 
corrected equation will yield unbiased estimators. However, Freeman et al (1998) show that by 
including the self-selectivity variables we introduce heteroscedasticity and they suggest 
estimating the corrected equations using Weighted Least Square (WLS) to obtain efficient 
parameters.   
  Sriboonchitta and Wibonnpongse (2004) contend that the methodology described above 
can also be used to modify the stochastic production frontier (SPF) model in order to estimate TE 
while avoiding self-selectivity bias. Thus, the SPF the using SRM can be repesented as:   
 
i i i i i u v W X Y 1 1 1 10 1
'
1 1 − + + = σ β  if  I  =  HIGH      (6) 
  
i i i i i u v W X Y 2 2 2 20 2
'
2 2 − + + = σ β   if I  =   L O W       ( 7 )  
 
where  vi,  is a random variable reflecting stochastic shocks entering into the frontier, and ui 
captures the technical inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier. The ML estimation of 
equations (6) and (7) will produce consistent parameter for the SPFs.  
To evaluate the sources of inefficiency we implement the Battese and Coelli (1995) 




ni n i e F + + = ∑
=1
0 α α µ           (8) 
 
  5where  Fni   is a vector of household-specific variables, αn  are unknown parameters and e  are 
unobservable random variables, assumed to be independently distributed. 
The data used to estimate these models come from a random sample of 530 project 
beneficiaries from PAES and 210 from CAJON for the agricultural year 2001-02.  The PAES 
project is divided into three (1, 2 and 3) to reflect the fact that it was implemented by three 
different companies.  After deleting all surveys with missing or incomplete data the final data set 
includes 639 observations. Table 1 presents the variables and their means.  
 
3. Results 
    Three different SPFs were estimated using the translog functional form where all 
variables are normalized by their geometric mean.  At the point of approximation, the three 
models satisfy monotonicity and convexity. The HIGH and LOW models include the self-
selectivity variables W1 and W2 estimated from the results obtained in the fist-stage regression.  
The Lee et al (1980) procedure was implemented to account for heteroscedasticity and to 
calculate the correct asymptotic covariance matrix and standard errors. The SPF for the entire 
sample (ALL) is included for comparison purposes.  Due to space limitation this discussion will 
focus only on the second-stage equations shown in Table 3. 
    The values for σ
2 and γ  are reported at the end of Table 3.  The null hypothesis that γ  = 
0 is rejected in all cases which suggests that TE is indeed stochastic.  Moreover, the value forγ  is 
statistically significant and ranges from 0.672 to 0.832 indicating that inefficiency is highly 
significant.  The parameters for the selectivity variables W1 and W2 are statistically significant, 
which supports the estimation of the SPF using the SRM.  Fuglie and Bosch (1995) suggest that 
the signs of the parameters for W1 and W2 (i.e., σ10 and σ20) have important economic 
  6interpretations. Assuming expected profit maximization, if σ10 and σ20 display the same sign, as is 
the case here, households with higher levels of adoption also have higher total output. Thus, these 
results indicate that soil conservation is compatible with improvements in total production among 
the households in the sample.  
The SPF results indicate that more than half of the estimated coefficients are significant at 
least at the 10% level and that the estimated production elasticities follow similar patterns in the 
three models.  Table 3 shows that, at the geometric mean of the data, FAMILY LABOR and 
PURCHASED INPUTS contribute the most to total household production.  The parameters for the 
three variables used to measure the effect of labor are consistently positive. Nevertheless, the 
statistical significance of these parameters varies among the three models.  For instance, the 
parameters for FAMILY LABOR and ADULTS are statistically different from zero in all cases. 
However, the parameter for HIRED LABOR is significant only in model LOW.  
Farm size presents positive but small effects in all estimated models. Indeed, the partial 
elasticity for LAND in model HIGH is 0.144, indicating that a 10% rise in total cultivated area 
could increase total household production by 1.44%. Lastly, all project variables display positive 
coefficients suggesting that farmers associated with PAES (1, 2 and 3) have higher levels of 
productivity than those working with CAJON. 
At the point of approximation, the function coefficient is equal to 0.87, 0.82 and 0.75 for 
models HIGH, ALL and LOW, respectively, suggesting the presence of decreasing returns to 
scale (DRTS).  Chavas et al (2005) indicate that in household-level analyses, the presence of 
DRTS implies that household resources are ‘too large’ for the technology implemented. Given 
that the farms under analysis are small in terms of land area, the source of DRTS is most likely 
due to a relatively high number of adults per household, a problem that might be offset by 
promoting off-farm employment opportunities (Chavas et al, 2005).      
  7The empirical results also show that the average levels of TE are 0.83, 0.77 and 0.74 for 
models HIGH, ALL and LOW, respectively. Based on paired t-tests, the differences among these 
means are statistically different from zero suggesting that households with higher levels of 
investment in soil conservation exhibit, on average, higher TE as well. These results also reveal 
considerable inefficiency, where, on average, households could reduce the level of inputs from 
17% to 26% and still generate the same level of earnings.  
Table 3 also presents the determinants of TE for each of the models estimated. Following 
common practice, the interpretation of the parameters is performed with respect to their effect on 
efficiency. As expected, EDUCATION and FREQUENCY display positive and statistically 
significant effects in all three models. Gorton and Davidova (2004) suggest that improvements in 
human capital enhance household efficiency by offering peasants the necessary means to achieve 
more with the available resources and the existing technology.  
Female-headed households exhibit lower TE than male-headed households in the three 
models. Similar outcomes have been reported by González (2004), and López and Valdés (2000), 
and different hypothesis have been proposed to explain this result. For instance, López and 
Valdés (2000) suggest that this finding does not necessarily mean that females are less efficient 
but may be related to the different kinds of production activities performed by male and females 
in Central America. González (2004) argues that gender inequalities, prevalent in rural Latin 
America, limit the access of women to information, land, capital and other inputs and this can 
adversely affect TE. This difference could also be explained by unmeasured non-economic 
activities performed by females in the household, since in less developed areas, female 
household-heads are not only in charge of their family business but they also take care of many 
other needs (child care, cooking, cleaning, etc).  
  8CREDIT presents a positive effect on household efficiency but it is statistically significant 
only in the model LOW. The literature shows mixed results with regards to the effect of credit 
assistance on productivity (Deininger et al, 2004; Binam et al, 2003). Nonetheless, the outcomes 
of this analysis suggest that households with low levels of investment in soil conservation may be 
credit constrained. Therefore, extension programs should take advantage of this situation and 
focus credit assistance on this group of households where credit presents a positive and 
significant effect for productivity improvement.   
Finally, the coefficient for OWNERSHIP is negative in all models but statistically 
significant only in the HIGH model. This suggests that TE decreases with land ownership, 
contradicting the neoclassical notion that land ownership is an economic incentive for farmers to 
improve their production technologies. Nevertheless, this seemingly contradictory finding has 
been reported in other studies (e.g., Binam et al, 2003; Byiringiro and Reardon, 1996).  Deininger 
et al (2003) claim that this result could be explained by the prevalence of imperfect rural land 
markets, which may restrict access to land to farmers, including those that may be the most 
technically efficient in a given geographical area.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to assess the connection between the adoption of soil 
conservation practices and household TE by comparing two types of farm-households in hillside 
regions of Honduras and El Salvador. A switching regression approach was used to test if there is 
a systematic difference between households with high and low levels of investment in soil 
conservation. The empirical analysis corroborates previous assumptions that a systematic 
difference exists between the two groups. 
  9The second-step analysis reveals that producers with higher levels of investments in soil 
conservation also exhibit higher TE. These producers also have the smallest farms and present the 
highest partial elasticity of production with respect to total cultivated land. These results suggest 
the presence of a market failure in the land market in the areas under analysis. Deininger et al 
(2003) claim that market failures in less-favorable areas denies access to land to many efficient 
rural producers. A workable approach to handle these market failures could be to strengthen the 
rental land market and to offer farmers the necessary financial support so that they can afford to 
rent additional land. 
Conversely, farms with lower levels of investment in soil conservation display the highest 
elasticities for purchased inputs and hired labor. In addition, access to credit is found to correlate 
with inefficiency, suggesting the presence of credit constraints. Thus, resource management 
programs should consider targeting credit programs to these households as a strategy for 
development and productivity improvement as well as for helping farmers to undertake the initial 
investments to adopt soil conservation techniques. Improved access to financial resources will 
also allow this group of farmers to acquire more inputs and to hire external labor. 
All three models show positive and significant effects of education and extension on 
technical efficiency. These results are not surprising since the average level of formal education 
among the sampled households is only 3.6 years. Furthermore, the analysis reveals substantial 
inefficiency for household production in El Salvador and Honduras, indicating considerable 
potential for profitability improvement. Thus, emphasis on improving farmers’ human capital by 
supporting agricultural training, extension and educational programs seems warranted.   
  10Table 1. Variable Definition and Means 
 
VARIABLES    DEFINITION ALL HIGH LOW
Practices  Percentage of total land with soil conservation practices  0.5 0.7 0.3
Age  Age of the household head  48.0 46.4 49.5
Education  Average level of education for household’s members ≥10 years old 
 
3.6 3.7 3.3
Gender  1 if the household head is a man (dummy) 0.9 0.9 0.9
Family Size  Number of people in the household  5.3 5.4 5.2
Land  Total number of Manzanas devoted to agricultural production  5.9 2.8 8.8





    
 
0.6 0.6 0.6
Ownership  1 if the household owns more than 50% of the farm (dummy) 0.7 0.8 0.6
Frequency  Number of visits by an extensionist to the farm  2.0 1.9 2.1
Years  Number of years involve with the projects  3.1 3.1 3.1
Credit  1 if the household uses financial credit (dummy) 0.3 0.3 0.2
Perception  1 if farmer is aware of the erosion problem in the area  0.81 0.93 0.69
Participation  1 if the household head participate in an organization (dummy) 0.6 0.6 0.6
H. Income  Total household income (US$)  2,110.6 2,347.9 1,860.4
Off-Farm Income  Wage labor in off-farm activities (US$)  541.0 517.4 565.9
Purchased Inputs  Total expenditure in variable inputs (US$)  657.8 799.9 507.9
Family Labor  Total family labor (working days)  43.5 47.1 39.7
Hired Labor  Total hired labor (US$)  20.3 24.6 15.6
Adults  Number of people in the household over the age of 15 
 
3.0 2.8 3.5
PAES 1  Household with PAES 1 (dummy) 148 97 58
PAES 2  Household with PAES 2 (dummy)  162 83 79
PAES 3  Household with PAES 3 (dummy)  155 64 84
CAJON  Household with CAJON (dummy) 174 84 90
   
No. of Households  639 328 311
  11Table 2. Second-Stage Stochastic Production Frontiers  
 
  ALL HIGH    LOW Variable
1  
Coef.  SD      Coef. SD Coef. SD
Constant  -3.045***  0.492  -4.208***  0.547  -3.018***  0.325 
Land  0.078*  0.054  0.144*  0.080  0.047*  0.027 
Purchased Inputs  0.244***  0.098  0.243***  0.098  0.254***  0.111 
Family Labor  0.312***  0.048  0.326***  0.062  0.228**  0.108 
Hired Labor  0.109  0.079  0.076  0.077  0.144*  0.080 
Adults  0.078*  0.028  0.089**  0.038  0.081**  0.040 
Slope  0.009  0.009  0.011  0.014  0.005  0.012 
W1 --  --  0.163*  0.094  --  -- 
W2 --  --  --  --  0.218*  0.136 
PAES 1  0.301***  0.082  0.323***  0.078  0.277***  0.083 
PAES 2  0.316***  0.094  0.322***  0.071  0.297***  0.112 
PAES 3  0.228**  0.108  0.291**  0.153  0.111**  0.055 
Quadratic and interaction terms excluded due to space limitations 
Inefficiency Model  
Constant   -2.985*     
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
1.268 -2.794***
 
0.757  1.781*  0.988 
Age  0.007 0.012 0.002 0.003  0.005  0.007 
Education  -0.412*** 0.175 -0.715** 0.340  -0.301**  0.126 
Gender  -0.996** 0.504 0.708** 0.317  -0.729**  0.365 
Frequency  -0.439* 0.237 -0.312* 0.162  0.201**  0.088 
Years   0.104 0.154 0.031 0.038  0.036  0.050 
Credit  -0.215 0.447 -0.211 0.196  -0.227*  0.134 
Ownership  0.701 0.558 0.598* 0.311  0.111  0.120 
Participation  -0.235 0.344
  -0.122
  0.136  -0.076  0.210 
          
Sigma-squared  σ
2 0.621***  0.128  0.842***  0.111  0.595***  0.066 
Gamma  γ  0.805***  0.051 
 
0.672***  0.071  0.832***  0.048 
log-likelihood    -540.85   
    
-675.36  -715.89   
Mean TE    0.77 0.83   0.74   
Returns to Scale    0.82     0.87   0.75   
* 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. 
1 The dependent variable is total household income, measured in US dollars.
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